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WHITE-COLLAR PLEA BARGAINING AND
SENTENCING AFTER BOOKER
STEPHANOS BIBAS*
Until 2004, white-collar sentencing appeared to exemplify the
ratchet effect. As the media exposed ever more corporate corruption
and shady dealing, lawmakers competed to prove their toughness
on crime by raising sentences. This irresistible force, however, met
a seemingly immovable object: the Supreme Court's new Sixth
Amendment limits on judicial sentencing. Apprendiv. Ndw Jersey, 1
Blakely v. Washington, 2 and most recently United States v. Booker3
Gave upended sentencing law by requiring juries, not judges, to find
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beyond a reasonable doubt facts that raise maximum sentences.
Booker's remedy was to invalidate the binding force of the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines. 4 Apprendi and Blakely have had large and
obvious effects on violent and drug crime prosecutions. These cases,
however, also portend a revolution in white-collar plea bargaining
and sentencing. This Essay is a brief effort to speculate about
federal white-collar plea bargaining and sentencing after Booker,
now that the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines are no longer binding.
Part I summarizes the criminal law's traditional leniency toward
white-collar defendants and how that thinking began to change.
Part II notes the U.S. Sentencing Commission's and Congress's
efforts to toughen white-collar penalties, culminating in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Part III considers how Booker changed
this landscape by striking down the Sentencing Guidelines. In the
short term, Booker restores some judicial power to counterbalance
prosecutorial control of plea bargaining and sentencing. The price,
however, is that judges have more leeway to show excessive
leniency, which will incense prosecutors and prod Congress to act.
Part IV discusses Congress's likely responses to this state of affairs.
Congress is unlikely to accept the status quo or to entrust cumber-
some fact-finding to juries. Rather, Congress will likely either
restore binding minimum guidelines or pass mandatory minimum
penalty statutes, which will greatly increase prosecutorial power to
charge bargain. White-collar sentencing may replicate SOJlle of the
pathologies of mandatory drug sentencing, although it will never be
as draconian in practice. Part V proposes two modest solutions.
First, clarifying how to compute losses would reduce prosecutorial
manipulation of white-collar sentences based on speculation about
the causes of stock-price drops and the like. Second, greater use of
shaming penalties could ensure short sentences with bite, to
express the community's condemnation while avoiding dispropor-
tionate punishment.
4. See id. at 769.
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I. TRADITIONAL LENIENCY TOWARD WHITE-COLLAR DEFENDANTS"
Traditionally, penalties for white-collar crimes such as fraud,
embezzlement, and insider trading were significantly lower than
penalties for violent, drug, or even physical property crimes. White-
collar offenders were much more likely to receive probation than
thieves who stole equivalent amounts, and when white-collar
offenders did go to prison their sentences were substantially
shorter. 5 For example, before the Sentencing Guidelines, an average
of 59% of fraud defendants received straight probation sentences,
and the average prison time served was seven months. 6 For tax
defendants, the figures were comparable: 57% received straight
probation, and the average prison time served was five and a half
months. 7 Generally, these white-collar defendants came from well-
off backgrounds, had no criminal histories, and seemed unlikely to
recidivate, let alone endanger anyone. So there was little need for
specific deterrence, and few people thought retribution required
imprisonment. Thus, white-collar criminals usually got probation,
community service, restitution, or similar soft punishments.
Our thinking about white-collar crime has undergone a sea
change in the last two decades. White-collar crime came to epito-
mize greed, which increasingly seemed morally wrong and more
deserving of retribution. 8 Moreover, the sentencing-reform move-
ment focused on meting out equal sentences for equally bad crimes. 9
5. Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon
Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 20 (1988).
6. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS 68-69tbls.2 & 3 (1987). The average prison time served
is an average of all offenders, not just those sentenced to prison; in computing the average,
the Sentencing Commission coded probationary sentences as zero-month sentences. Id. at
69 tb1.3.
7. Id. at 68-69 tbls.2 & 3.
8. See BRYAN BURROUGH &JOHN HELYAR, BARBARLI\NSATTHE GATE: THE FALL oFRJR
NABISCO 515 (1990) (relating a failed corporate takeover bid at RJR Nabisco and, in the
process, critiquing Wall Street's morality); JAMES B. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES 445 (1991)
(describing the prosecution of Wall Street brokers who engaged in insider trading and other
crimes); WALL STREET (Twentieth Century Fox 1987). In Wall Street, the villain, Michael
Douglas's character Gordon Gekko, intones the famous line "greed is good" and trades on
inside information. Id. But the hero, Charlie Sheen's character Bud Fox, eventually goes to
prison for insider trading and cooperates with the prosecution against Gekko. Id.
9. The movement started with Judge Marvin Frankel's call to arms in the 1970s. See
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If we imprison the black teenager who steals a $25,000 car, equal·
treatment demands that we also imprison the middle-aged white
guy who steals $25,000. Otherwise, sentencing judges may be
indulging unconscious racial and class stereotypes by going easy on
defendants who remind judges of themselves or with whom judges
can identify.lO
In addition, white-collar crime is more rational, cool, and
calculated than sudden crimes of passion or opportunity, so it
should be a prime candidate for general deterrence. An economist
would argue that if one increased the expected cost of white-collar
crime by raising the expected penalty, white-collar crime would be
unprofitable and would thus cease. ll
Nevertheless, many judges lean toward home confinement or
probation. 12 Although economists may focus on ex ante deterrence,
judges may prefer to look ex post at the sympathetic, white,
educated offender who reminds judges of themselves and seems to
pose no danger. Allowing these offenders to escape imprisonment,
however, is inequitable and undercuts the law's deterrent and
moral message condemning white-collar crime.
II. CONGRESS AND THE SENTENCING COMMISSION TOUGHEN
PENALTIES
In the early 1980s, Congress indicated that it wanted to raise
white-collar sentences,13 and the Sentencing Commission set out to
do so. Although the Sentencing Commission based most of its
sentencing guidelines on average past sentences, it raised sentenc-
ing ranges for white-collar crimes to bring them into line with
larceny sentences. 14 By using short but certain terms of imprison-
M.ARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCING: LAw WITHOUT ORDER (1973).
10. See Douglas Laycock, Vicious Stereotypes in Polite Society, 8 CONST. CO:Ml'vlENT. 395,
395 (1991).
11. See RICHARD A POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAw 205 (3d ed. 1986). See
generally NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, ESSAYS IN THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT (Gary S. Becker & William M. Landes eds., 1974) (examining various economic
approaches to combatting crime).
12. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
13. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 177 (1983), as reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.CAN. 3182,3360.
14. U.S. SENTENCING COM!Vl'N, supra note 6, at 17-18.
2005] WHITE-COLLAR PLEA BARGAINING 725
ment to deter and punish, the Commission hoped to reduce greatly.
the percentage of offenders receiving probation. 15 .
The Sentencing Guidelines somewhat checked the judicial
temptation to leniency but did not stop it. Federal judgescontin-
ued to give non-imprisonment sentences to more than 30% of
fraud defendants and more than 40% of embezzlers. 16 When the
Sentencing Guidelines gave judges the option of imprisonment or
another alternative, such as probation or home confinement, judges
chose the non-prison alternative for about 57% of embezzlers and
65% of fraud defendants. 17 Moreover, judges sometimes departed
downward from the Sentencing Guidelines to give probationary
sentences to white-collar defendants who would otherwise have
received prison terms.18 For example, when I was a federal
prosecutor, I prosecuted one conspiracy that had defrauded the U.S.
Postal Service of between $55,000 and $91,000. The ringleader of
the conspiracy was a young man from a good family who had gone
to college and then entered the family business, orchestrating a
series of false and inflated billings and records that spanned
several years. The Sentencing Guidelines clearly required a short
imprisonment term for this cold, premeditated, prolonged fraud.
Yet the district judge pitied him, departed downward, and sen-
tenced him to probation. The judge's strained rationale was that
the prolonged scheme was supposedly an "aberrant act."19 Every
15. See id. at 68 tb1.2 (projecting that the proposed Sentencing Guidelines would reduce
the percentage of straight-probation sentences from 59% to 24% for fraud and from 57% to
3% for income tax offenses); John R. Steer, The Sentencing Commission's Implementation of
Sarbanes-Oxley, 15 FED. SENT'G REP. 263, 263 (2003).
16. Frank o. Bowman, III, A Challenge to the Rationale for General Economic Crime
Sentence Increases Following Sarbanes-Oxley: Letter of Frank Bowman to U.S. Sentencing
Commission, 15 FED. SENT'G REP. 284, 286-87 & figs.5a & 5c (2003).
17. U.S. SENTENCING COMlV1'N, 2002 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS
fig.F (2003), available at http://www.ussc.gov/annrpt/2002/sbtoc02.htm.
18. See id. at 56 tb1.27 (reporting non-substantial-assistance downward-departure rates
of 8.6% for embezzlement, 9.9% for fraud, 12.5% for antitrust violations, and 17.1% for tax
offenders).
19. Such a prolonged fraud should not have qualified for the aberrant-act departure. See
United States v. Eaton, No. 98-4502, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 1423, at *9 (4th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999)
(requiring that the aberrant conduct be a brief departure from a law-abiding life); Zecevic v.
U.S. Parole Comm'n, 163 F.3d 731, 734-36 (2d Cir. 1998) (same); United States v. Withrow,
85 F.3d 527,531 (11th Cir. 1996) (same); United States v. Duerson, 25 F.3d 376,381 (6th Cir.
1994) (same); United States v. Carey, 895 F.2d 318,325 (7th Cir. 1990) (same). Aberrant-act
departures are now limited by U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANuAL § 5K2.20(b) & cmt. 2
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federal prosecutor can tell stories like this one: although the
majority of judges generally follow the Sentencing Guidelines, some
judges_find ways to misapply, twist, or circumvent them.
To counteract judicial leniency, the Sentencing Commission
raised sentences for theft and fraud in 1998 and again in its 2001
Economic Crime Package. 20 Mter Enron filed for bankruptcy at the
end of 2001, President Bush, members of Congress, and the
Department of Justice called for even tougher penalties,21 which
resulted in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. The Act ordered the
Sentencing Commission to review and consider enhancing the
Sentencing Guidelines to reflect the seriousness of fraud and
related offenses. 22 In compliance, the Sentencing Commission
raised its penalties for fraud even further and added more
enhancements. 23 These enhancements required judges to imprison
defendants for moderate to large frauds. Very simple frauds of
$70,000 or less, or $30,000 or less that involved the use of the mails
(2004).
20. See Sentencing Guidelines for the United States Courts, 66 Fed. Reg. 30,512, 30,540
(June 6,2001) (stating the Sentencing Commission's reasons for consolidating guidelines for
theft and fraud); Sentencing Guidelines for the United States Courts, 63 Fed. Reg. 65,982,
65,982-92 (Nov. 30, 1998).
21. See generally Frank O. Bowman, III, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and What Came After,
15 FED. SENT'G REP. 231, 231 (2003) (describing how the Bush administration and
congressional Republicans felt pressure to address white-collar crime).
Another element of the story is that high drug sentences likely helped to dragwhite-collar
sentences upward. Once drug sentences increased to five, ten, and twenty years, one- and
two-year white-collar sentences looked paltry in comparison. Because of the ratchet effect,
drug sentences were immovably high. Thus, the only way to keep pace and reduce inter-
crime disparity was to raise white-collar sentences to compensate. Penalties for White Collar
Crime: Are We Really Getting Tough on Crime?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime,
Corrections, and Victims' Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Congo (2002)
(statement of Frank O. Bowman, III, Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School
of Law), reprinted in Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing, June 2002: Selected Testimony,
15 FED. SENT'G REP. 234, 238 (2002).
22. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 1104(a), (b)(1), 116 Stat. 745, 808-
09.
23. See U.S. SE TENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(a), (b)(14) (2003) (raising the base
offense level from six to seven for offenses with statutory maxima of twenty years or more
and adding four-level enhancement for securities and commodities violations by officers or
directors); SUPPLEMENTTOTHE2002U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANuAL § 2B1.1(b)(1)(O),
(P) (2003), auailable at http://www.USSC.gov/2002Suppb/2002Suppb.pdf (enhancements for
losses above $200 million); id. § 2B1.1(b)(12)(B)(ii), (iii) (adding four-level enhancement for
endangering the solvency or financial security of a publicly traded company or one with 1000
employees or endangering 100 victims).
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or telephone, however, could still result in probation if the defen-:'
dants pleaded guilty.24
Describing these penalties as mandatory, however, is misleading.
Just as so-called mandatory minimum statutes bind sentencing
judges but not prosecutors who choose not to charge them, so the
Sentencing Guidelines are subject to a host of prosecutorial
manipulation. In other words, the Sentencing Guidelines constrain
judicial discretion but still leave significant discretion in the hands
of prosecutors.
For example, section 2B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines keys the
base offense level to the statutory maximum sentence of the crime
charged.25 If the prosecutor chooses to file a mail or wire fraud
charge, the base offense level is seven, but if the prosecutor chooses
instead to charge it as simple embezzlement or false statements
to the government, the base offense level is six. This one-level
difference frequently means the difference between brief imprison-
ment and probation and gives prosecutors leverage to extract
pleas. Moreover, prosecutors can choose to decline or divert charges
for civil resolution or restitution, enter into non-prosecution
agreements, or sign cooperation agreements. All of these avenues
leave prosecutors the keys to the prison. Alternatively, if prosecu-
tors want to imprison someone for only a short time, they can
charge bargain down to misdemeanors or other offenses with low
statutory maxima. 26 For example, Jamie Olis's two codefendants in
the Dynegy scandal accepted charge bargains that capped their
sentences at five years, but Olis insisted on going to trial and lost. 27
His penalty for exercising his constitutional right to trial was steep:
24. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANuAL § 2B1.1(a)(1)-(2), (b)(l)(D)-(E) (2004)
(setting base offense levels and loss enhancements for fraud); id. § 3E1.1 (authorizing up to
three-level reductions for acceptance of responsibility); id. ch. 5, pt. A (sentencing table).
25. Id. § 2Bl.l.
26. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 641 (2000) (punishing theft of$1000 or less from the government
by up to one year in prison); id. § 655 (specifying the same penalties for theft of $1000 or less
from a federally insured bank by a bank examiner); id. § 656 (specifying the same penalties
for theft, embezzlement, or misapplication of $1000 or less from a federally insured bank by
a bank officer or employee).
27. See Susan Warren, Refusing to Talk, Dynegy's Glis Goes to Prison, WALLST.J., May
20, 2004, at B1 (reporting that Olis's codefendants capped their prison exposure at five years
by pleading to one count each whereas Olis did not).
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the Sentencing Guidelines demanded a sentence of at least 292,
months, more than 24 years. 28 .
Moreover, prosecutors have substantial room to bargain over the
facts. Fraud sentences depend on the dollar amount of losses. 29 If
prosecutors pull out all the stops to dig up every last victim and
dollar lost, they can raise sentences substantially.30 Conversely,
prosecutors can lower sentences if they agree not to press arguable
but speculative losses and if they terminate investigations after the
defendant quickly agrees to plead guilty. Prosecutors can also
manipulate other vaguely worded enhancements, such as whether
a crime involved sophisticated means, substantially endangered a
company's solvency, or abused the company's trust. 31
Why did prosecutors push for these guideline enhancements? In
part, they were understandably frustrated with lenient judges. A
minority of judges do not view white-collar crime as serious and
refuse to impose jail sentences unless forced to do so. Part of the
prosecutors' motivation was to create more specific deterrence and
retribution. But prosecutors themselves show enough mercy and
carve out enough exceptions through charge- and fact-bargaining
that toughness is not the sole explanation.
Rather, these huge penalties give prosecutors, and not judges,
control over the key decision: will a defendant be imprisoned?
Prosecutors trust their own gatekeeping abilities and sense of
justice. Their ability to create huge disparities between ;post-plea
and post-trial sentences allows them to make credible threats and
promise huge rewards to induce pleas. White-collar defendants, who
might otherwise roll the dice in all-or-nothing gambles to clear
28. Id. Shortly before this Essay went to press, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit vacated Olis's sentence and remanded for resentencing under the now advisory
Guidelines. See infra note 74.
29. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANuAL § 2B1.1(a), (b)(1) (2004) (setting forth a
loss table, which gradually increases offense levels from six to thirty-six).
30. Prosecutors use the same tactic in drug cases, bargaining over drug quantities
possessed or sold by co-conspirators that mayor may not have been reasonably foreseeable
to the defendant. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 27 (reporting that the judge in Olis's case
settled on a loss amount over the $100 million threshold required to lengthen the sentence
to 292 months).
31. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(8)(B) (2004) (sophisticated-
means enhancement); id. § 2B1.1(b)(12) (substantial-endangerment-of-solvency enhance-
ment); id. § 3B1.3 (abuse-of-trust enhancement).
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their names, undoubtedly become more pliable when faced with
enormous sentencing differentials.
This plea-bargaining leverage is particularly important in
cracking large, multi-defendant frauds and conspiracies.
Prosecutors have to start with the small fry and flip them to use
their testimony in going after the big fish. 32 Lower-level employees
may feel loyalty to their bosses, and the code of silence may inhibit
them from revealing their crimes. The threat of substantial prison
terms makes these employees more willing to cooperate with the
government, as section 5Kl.l cooperation letters are often the only
way around otherwise mandatory sentencing guidelines. 33 This
need for leverage to flip lower-level employees was one of the
Department of Justice's justifications for seeking to raise sentences
for lower-loss frauds. 34
To summarize, the increasingly stiff penalties for white-collar
crimes, culminating in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley amendments,
suited prosecutors just fine. Until January 2005, the Sentencing
Guidelines functioned as a massive, intricate, interlocking set of
minimum and maximum sentences that boundjudges. Although the
Sentencing Guidelines purported to base sentences on real-offense
conduct, in practice they were quite susceptible to prosecutorial
manipulation. 35 Prosecutors could have a field day bargaining over
32. See At Last, a Prosecution in the Enron Debacle, ACCT., Sept. 1,2002; Mary Flood &
Tom Fowler, Enron from the Inside, HODS. CHRON., Sept. 28, 2004, at A1 (describing
prosecutors' strategy of building a case against Michael Kopper, who pleaded guilty and
testified against Andrew Fastow, who then pleaded guilty, in order to build enough evidence
to prosecute Kenneth Lay and Jeffrey Skilling); Michael Hedges, The Fall of Enron:
Targeting Skilling, Lay May Prove Tough, HODS. CHRON., Aug. 25, 2002, at A1; Michael
Hedges, Former Enron Executive to Plead Guilty to Wire Fraud, Money Laundering Charges,
HODS. CHRON., Aug. 21, 2002, at Al.
33. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANuAL § 5K1.1 (2004).
34. Public Hearing Before the U.S. Sentencing Commission (Mar. 25, 2003), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/hearings/3_25_03/032503ts.htm (statement of William Mercer, U.S.
Attorney for the District of Montana and Chair of the Sentencing Guidelines Subcommittee
of the Attorney General's Advisory Committee, on behalf of the Department of Justice),
reprinted in Transcript of U.S. Sentencing Commission Hearing on Amendments in Response
to Sarbanes-Oxley, March 25, 2003, 15 FED. SENT'G. REP. 291, 292 (2003) ("Because
investigators must often work their way up the corporate ladder to uncover the extent of the
scheme and bring the perpetrators to justice, we have found that the threat of prison time
makes lower-level employees more willing to cooperate and provide information to obtain
leniency.").
35. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law's Disappearing
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charges and facts to force pleas, ensure cooperation, and achieve
their own sense of just deserts. Because prosecutors had flexibility
but judges did not, judges lost the ability to check and balance
unilateral prosecutorial charging decisions. 36 Ifprosecutors thought
the penalties were appropriate, they could choose to apply them. If
they thought them too harsh or wanted to induce plea bargains or
cooperation, they could show mercy. But judges, by and large, could
not.
III. How BOOKER UPSETS PROSECUTORS' GAME BOARD
United States v. Booker37 changed all of that. Five Justices held
that the Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment
because they allowed judges, not juries, to raise maximum guideline
sentences based on facts proven by a preponderance of the
evidence. 38 A very different majority held that the appropriate
remedy was to make the Sentencing Guidelines advisory and to
allow appellate review of sentences for reasonableness. 39 Much ink
has already been spilled on Booker's wisdom and internal
(in)consistency, and so I will not wade into that debate here.
Rather, my focus is how Booker's remedial holding will affect
white-collar charging, plea bargaining, and sentencing. Booker's
scope remains largely unclear. Many district judges are giving
"heavy weight" to the newly advisory Sentencing Guidelines and
sentencing within them "in all but the most exceptional cases."40
Others insist that Booker gives judges substantially more flexibility
to lower sentences that seem unduly harsh. 41 Although it is too
Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2557, 2559-60 (2004).
36. See generally GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING'S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA
BARGAINING IN AMERICA 205·30 (2003) (discussing the balance of power between judges and
prosecutors in setting sentences); Stephanos Bibas, The Feeney Amendment and the
Continuing Rise ofProsecutorial Power to Plea Bargain, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 295,
299-301 (2004).
37. 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
38. Id. at 746, 755-56 (Stevens, J., merits majority opinion, joined by Scalia, Souter,
Thomas & Ginsburg, JJ.).
39. Id. at 756-57, 765 (Breyer, J., remedial majority opinion, joined by Rehnquist, C.J.,
and O'Connor, Kennedy & Ginsburg, JJ.).
40. E.g., United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910, 925 (D. Utah 2005).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Jaber, 362 F. Supp. 2d 365, 369-75 (D. Mass. 2005)
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early. to tell who will win this debate, Booker clearly has made the
rule-driven Sentencing Guidelines at least somewhat more flexible.
Preliminary data indicate that 61.4% of sentences still fall within
the Sentencing Guideline range, down from 65.0% in fiscal year
2002. However, 36.8% are below the Sentencing Guideline range,
up from 34.2%, while 1.8% are above the range, up from 0.8%.42
In other words, Booker has already made judges' sentences a
little less predictable, and this effect will likely grow as judges test
their new-found freedom. On the one hand, reduced predictability
might undercut general deterrence. This danger is particularly
acute because defendants can overoptimistically predict abnormally
low sentences for themselves, just as they do under indeterminate
sentencing regimes. 43 Booker could thus hinder the law's ex ante
deterrent effect. Certainty ofapprehension and conviction influence
deterrence far more than severity of punishment, however, so
Booker's effect on deterrence may be modest. 44
On the other hand, Booker's flexibility restores some balance of
power by preventing prosecutors from unilaterally promising or
threatening certain results upon trial and upon plea. Judges regain
more power to adjust sentences to fit their ex post perceptions of
individual defendants' blameworthiness and need for specific
deterrence.
Booker's consequences may be dramatic. The sentencing differen-
tial between trial and plea will become less predictable and likely
smaller. For example, prosecutors can no longer ensure that Jamie
(disagreeing with Wilson and suggesting that the decision accords too much weight to the
now advisory Sentencing Guidelines); United States v. Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d 984, 987
(E.D. Wis. 2005) (disagreeing with Wilson and holding that courts are free to diverge from
the Sentencing Guidelines "so long as the ultimate sentence is reasonable and carefully
supported by reasons tied to [statutory] factors").
42. Memorandum from Linda Drazga Maxfield, Office ofPolicy Analysis, U.S. Sentencing
Comm'n, to Judge Hinojosa, Chair, and Tim McGrath, Staff Dir., U.S. Sentencing Comm'n
1 (Apr. 5, 2004), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Blakelylbooker_041305.pdf.
43. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARv. L.
REV. 2463, 2500 (2004).
44. Penalties for White Collar Crime: Are We Really Getting Tough on Crime?: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Corrections, and Victims' Rights of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 107th Congo (2002) (statement of John C. Coffee, Jr., Professor of Law, Columbia
University Law School), reprinted in Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing, July 2002:
Testimony ofMichael Chertoff, John C. Coffee, and Thomas Donaldson, 15 FED. SENT'G REP.
244, 246 (2003).
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Glis's sentence after trial will be 24 years while his codefendants
will serve only five. Although judges will probably continue to
reward pleas and punish trials to clear their dockets, they can
temper at least the most draconian post-trial sentences. Their
freedom to do so will turn in part on how stringently appellate
courts apply reasonableness review. If the gap between post-trial
and post-plea sentences shrinks and becomes less certain, defen-
dants will feel less pressure to plead.
Put another way, defendants can hold out more hope, rational or
overoptimistic, of judicial leniency if they go to trial or reject a
cooperation agreement. A section 5K1.1 cooperation letter used to
be almost the only way around the Sentencing Guidelines, so
defendants raced each other to be the first to cooperate. 45 As a
result, the cooperation rate was massive: almost one-fifth of
defendants received section 5K1.1 departures and more than twice
as many unsuccessfully offered assistance. 46 Now, because prosecu-
tors' threats of post-trial harshness are somewhat less credible, and
there is more than one way around that fate, defendants may be
more likely to roll the dice by risking trial. The cooperation rate will .
probably go down somewhat. The 6% trial rate 47 will go up unless,
as seems likely, prosecutors offer even more generous plea bargains
to compensate, driving sentences down. Thus, complex frauds and
conspiracies will become substantially harder to prove because
small fry are less willing to flip and testify against big fish.
IV. POSSIBLE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSES TO BOOKER
Booker is so new that we do not know if, when, or how Congress
will respond. Right now, opponents of the Sentencing Guidelines
are rejoicing because the advisory-guideline system seems to return
45. See U.S SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANu.<\L § 5K1.1 (2004); Bibas, supra note 43, at
2485-86.
46. LINDA DRAZGA MA..XFIELD & JOHN H. KRA\'vIER, U.S. SENTENCING Col'vIM'N,
SUBSTANTIALAsSISTANCE: AN El'vIPIRICAL YARDSTICK GAUGING EQUITY I CIJRRENT FEDERAL
POLICY M'D PRACTICE 9-10 (1998), available at http://www.ussc.gov/publicat/5kreport.pdf;
U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N , supra note 17, fig.G.
47. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS 2002, at tbl.5.17 (2004), available at http://www.albany.edulsourcebookl
pdflsb2002/sb2002-section5.pdf.
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to judges the flexibility for which they have longed. This state of
affairs, however, will likely be short-lived. In the long run, even if
most judges follow the Sentencing Guidelines most of the time,
anecdotes of undue leniency will accumulate, prompting Congress
to re-regulate judges in one of three ways.
Option One: Make the Sentencing Guidelines binding again and
require juries to find facts beyond a reasonable doubt. The Booker
remedial dissenters would have preferred this option.48 Justice
Scalia and others believe that jury fact- finding is necessary to fulfill
the Sixth Amendment's guarantee ofjury trial. They would welcome
this overt role for juries at sentencing, much as in Ring v. Arizona,
in which they required a jury finding of an aggravating factor to
trigger the death penalty.49
Option one would in effect drive a tank through Sarbanes-Oxley.
Juries would have to find beyond a reasonable doubt numerous
facts to trigger enhancements, in particular the dollar amount of
losses. In many of the largest white-collar cases, however, the loss
amount is highly speculative. For example, Jamie Olis's loss
computation was based on the entire $105 million loss in value that
the University of California's Dynegy stock holding suffered over
the course of eighteen months.50 The judge accepted this figure
even though one-third of the loss predated Dynegy's restatement of
earnings, and even though an expert attributed most of the loss to
the Enron collapse and a failed merger. 51 Proving fraud-on-the-
market losses beyond a reasonable doubt may be all but impossible,
particularly if sophisticated accounting arguments and maneuvers
baffle lay jurors. Thus, sentences for securities and commodities
frauds would likely drop significantly. In cases where defendants
have taken discrete sums of money from identifiable victims or
48. 125 S. Ct. 738, 779 (Stevens, J., remedial dissent).
49. See 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).
50. Laura Brubaker Calkins, Ex-Dynegy Finance Exec Gets 24 Years for Fraud, SEATILE
TIMES, Mar. 26, 2004, at C2; Tom Fowler, Appeal Calls Dynegy Figure's Sentence Improper,
HODS. CBRON., Aug. 19, 2004, at B3 [hereinafter Fowler, Appeal Calls]; Tom Fowler,
Supreme Court Decision Changes Rules, Lawyer Says, HODS. CBRON., Feb. 1, 2005, at B1
[hereinafter Fowler, Supreme Court].
51. Calkins, supra note 50; Fowler, Appeal Calls, supra note 50; Fowler, Supreme Court,
supra note 50. Shortly before this Essay went to press, Olis's sentence was vacated and his
case remanded for resentencing. See infra note 74.
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entities, however, jurors would probably still find and apply
enhancements.
Jurors might temper sentences even more if they knew the
sentencing consequences of their decisions. A jury would likely look
ex post at the sympathetic, non-dangerous defendant before it and
decide that little or no imprisonment is necessary. Juries would
not likely inflate sentences to punish defendants for going to trial,
for not cooperating, or to send messages and foster general
deterrence. 52 The line of cases culminating in Booker is premised
upon the idea that jurors authorize a certain level of punishment by
their guilty verdict. 53 But the idea that juries authorize punishment
in any meaningful sense is an unmitigated legal fiction. Courts keep
juries in the dark about punishments, forbid lawyers to mention
them, and instruct juries not to think about them.54
Option one is unlikely to happen because it is too cumbersome.
In Kansas, where the state courts require jury fact-finding under
sentencing guidelines, prosecutors rarely bother with penalty
trials. 55 Instead, when they desire extended sentences, they evade
separate penalty trials through creative charging and consecutive
sentencing. 56 Juries would struggle with confusing multi-part
special verdict forms, as they did in the WorldCom CEO Bernard
Ebbers's trial. Moreover, because Congress wants to raise penalties
and help prosecutors, it is not about to give defendants added
procedural protections that would impede prosecution a,nd gut
Sarbanes-Oxley.
52. Indeed, some courts strongly discourage or forbid prosecutors to argue in closing that
jurors should use their verdict to send a message. See, e.g., State v. Grimes, No. C-030922,
slip op. at 3 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2005); Commonwealth v. Hall, 701 A.2d 190, 203 (Pa.
1997).
53. See, e.g., Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 742,749; Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305 &
n.S (2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 491 n.16 (2000).
54. See, e.g., Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 586-87 (1994) (repeating "the rule
against informing jurors of the consequences of their verdicts"); Stephanos Bibas, Judicial
Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097,
1182-83 (2001).
55. Chief Judge Richard Walker, Kan. Sentencing Comm'n, Address at a Stanford Law
School Symposium: The Future of American Sentencing: A National Roundtable on Blakely
(Oct. 9, 2004).
56. Id.
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, Option Two: Make Sentencing Guidelines minima binding bu,t
keep the maxima advisory. This is sometimes known as "topless
guidelines" or "the Bowman proposal" because Professor Frank
Bowman initially proposed it57 (but has since retreated from the
idea). Option two takes advantage of Harris v. United States, which
held that judges may continue to find facts that trigger minima by
a preponderance of the evidence. 58 By making maxima advisory,
option two prevents judicial fact-finding at sentencing from ever
raising penalty ceilings, so it complies with the letter (but not the
spirit) of Booker. The proposal seeks to restore something like the
status quo ante before Blakely and Booker were decided, though
removing the ceilings might raise penalties somewhat. 59
Although at one time option two seemed the most likely response,
enthusiasm has waned and even its author has disavowed it. But
if Congress were to enact it, it would largely replicate pre-Booker
plea bargaining. Prosecutors would once again be able to manipu-
late myriad sentencing rules to induce plea bargains and coopera-
tion and to achieve their own ideas of sufficient punishment.
Judges, once again, would be helpless. If a handful of judges abuse
their newly won freedom by going easy on many white-collar
offenders, the result may be much less flexibility for judges as a
whole. The re-regulation may take the form of option two or even
stiffer regulation under option three.
Option Three: Create Mandatory Minimum Penalty Statutes. If
even a few judges seem too eager to give white-collar defendants
probation, Congress may set aside the scalpel of guidelines and
seize the sledgehammer of mandatory minima. Just as in the drug
arena, legislators may try to seem tough by outbidding each other,
leading to a ratchet effect. The result may be one-, two-, five-, and
ten-year mandatory minima for the crime dujour--eorporate fraud.
57, See Memorandum on Legislative Solutions to Blakely from Frank Bowman to U.S.
Sentencing Comm'n (July 16, 2004), reprinted in Memorandum Presenting the Case for Rapid
Congressional Reaction in Response to Blakely v. Washington, 16 FED. SENT'G REP. 369, 371,
373 (2004).
58. 536 U.S. 545,586 (2002). Of course, if the Court were to change its mind about its 5-4
decision in Harris, option two would no longer be exempt from Apprendi and Blakely's
strictures.
59. See Stephanos Bibas, Blakely's Federal Aftermath, 16 FED. SENT'G REP. 333, 337
(2004).
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Just as in the drug arena, these penalties will be trumpeted as,
getting tough on the fat cats at the top of Enron, WorldCom, and
the like. But just as in the drug arena, these nets will catch fish far
smaller than Ken Lay and Bernard Ebbers. After all, the wider the
net, the more leverage prosecutors have in getting smaller fish to
cooperate against bigger ones. Widening the punishment net is a
low-cost way for Congress to help prosecutors, whereas funding
additional inspectors and prosecutors is far more expensive. Thus,
Congress has every incentive to give prosecutors more powerful
tools; failing to do so risks seeming soft on crime, which voters hate.
If a particular prosecutor enforces the minima literally in a way
that seems too harsh, voters will blame the prosecutor rather than
Congress: witness Ken Starr.60 In short, Congress has incentives to
trust prosecutorial discretion far more than judicial discretion to
adjudicate appropriate punishments.
This resulting transfer of power to prosecutors will not fill the
prisons with pencil-pushers. Just as prosecutors do not apply
mandatory drug penalties in 35% of the eligible cases,61 prosecutors
willcharge-bargain away draconian white-collar sentences most of
the time. In other words, the statutes will set starting points and
high mental anchors, but plea bargaining will establish realistic
floors. Because these floors will be hugely discounted below the
nominal sticker prices, they will seem like good discounts rather
than bad outcomes. Thus, defendants will be more, eager to
bargain. 62
A handful of defendants, however, will pay the sticker prices.
First, prosecutors hunt famous defendants like big-game trophies.
Prosecutors can earn valuable reputations by refusing to bargain
away strong cases against prominent corporate CEOs. 63 By forcing
60. See Stuntz, supra note 35, at 2557 (noting that Kenneth Starr received most of the
blame for the investigation of President Clinton).
61. M"illcL. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: CASES, STATUTES,AND
EXECUTIVE MA.TERIALS 1262 (2d ed. 2003).
62. For a more thorough discussion of how these anchoring and framing effects affect
bargaining under determinate or structured sentencing, see Bibas, supra note 43, at 2514-15,
2519.
63 See id. at 2472 & n.27.
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these cases to trial, they earn high-profile notches in their belts and
favorable, marketable publicity.64
Second, defendants who are too stubborn to bargain or to flip will
suffer. Prosecutors may initially charge minnows to get them to
cooperate against bigger fish, or overcharge a medium-size fish
simply to induce a quick plea. If the minnow thrashes about in the
net and puts up a fight, it may antagonize prosecutors, who will
probably stand by their threats rather than throw the minnow back
into the sea. Some might view the Olis case this way; prosecutors
were happy to settle for a five-year sentence,65 but when Olis put up
a fight, they made good on their threats to inflict 24 years instead. 66
After all, threats made during plea bargaining would lose their
effectiveness if defendants learned that prosecutors did not
follow through with them. This net-widening effect, including the
catching of ever-smaller fish, is one frequent criticism of drug
enforcement.67 Drug laws that were supposed to target kingpins are
now used much more often against street-level dealers, who deserve
significant punishment but not as much as the kingpins. Once
mandatory minima spread to ordinary white-collar crime, white- .
collar enforcement will suffer some of the same pathologies that
drug enforcement does today.
Two significant countervailing forces, however, will ensure that
white-collar enforcement never becomes as harsh as drug enforce-
ment. The first is simple human decency. Prosecutors, after all, are
human beings, and most of them are good, decent people. At some
point, most will recoil from making potentially useful but unconscio-
nable threats, although their tolerance for punishment may be
higher than the average person's.68 As Professor William Stuntz
points out, prosecutors do not simply maximize punishment, but
64. Id.
65. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (reporting that prosecutors agreed to five-
year sentences for Glis's codefendants).
66. See Warren, supra note 27.
67. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking Mandatory Minimums, 28 WARE FOREST
L. REV. 199, 212 (1993) (criticizing mandatory minima as heavily penalizing low-level
offenders).
68. Cf Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.s. 357, 364-65 (1978) (upholding a prosecutor's
decision to reindict a defendant on heavier charges carrying a possible life sentence because
the defendant had refused to take an offered plea bargain).
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use a complex calculus that includes their own sense of justice as .'
well as that ofvoters. 69 Most prosecutors probably view white-collar
crime as serious, but not as serious as violent or major drug crime.
It deserves months or years in prison, but seldom decades.
Second, white-collar defendants receive better representation
from their defense lawyers. Most drug defendants are not well-off
and must accept whatever counsel the court appoints for them.
Some appointed defense counsel are excellent, but others are not.
White-collar defendants, however, frequently can afford to retain
experienced private counsel. These lawyers, many of whom used to
be prosecutors,70 know the ropes and have established relationships
with their former prosecutorial colleagues. As a result, they may
persuade prosecutors before indictment to accept civil settlements
and restitution in lieu of criminal charges. Moreover, the prospect
of facing an aggressive, well-funded defense lawyer may make
prosecutors more flexible in plea bargaining.71 In contrast, low-level
white-collar defendants, such as secretaries, may not enjoy these
benefits. Although their employers might pay for good defense
counsel, these lawyers may discourage them from taking favorable
pleas and cooperating against their superiors.72
All in all, while white-collar sentencing will never be exactly like
drug sentencing, the parallels are ominous enough to be troubling.
One can only hope that Congress does not go far down the drug
sentencing road.
V. A FEW MODEST SOLUTIONS
I do not purport to have a grand solution to the mess created by
Booker. There are, however, a few more specific things that the
69. See Stuntz, supra note 35, at 2554 (describing the utility function prosecutors use to
determine punishment).
70. See, e.g., Ken Belson & Jonathan Glater, A Folksy Lawyer with a High-Powered
Client, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2005, at C1 (discussing Reid Weingarten, defense lawyer for
former Secretary of Agriculture Mike Espy, WorldCom's Bernard Ebbers, Tyco
International's Mark Belnick, the Teamsters' Ron Carey, and Enron's Richard Causey).
71. See Bibas, supra note 43, at 2479,2481·83 (maintaining that private attorneys who
bill by the hour have the incentive and time to defend their clients more effectively).
72. See Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 69, 122-26 (1995)
(arguing that attorneys will not promote cooperation if they want the client's corporation to
recommend them for other cases).
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Sentencing Commission can do on its own to improve this area,
inflicting punishment with bite without locking most people up for
decades.
First, the Sentencing Commission should clarify how to compute
losses in areas that are currently murky, such as the large
accounting-fraud cases premised on drops in a stock's price.73 In the
Olis case, Judge Lake treated the loss in value suffered by one
shareholder over eighteen months as the loss amount. 74 But surely
this is too crude a· measure. What if the entire stock market
dropped 25% during that time? What if all stocks in that line of
business dropped 25%? What if the drop in price might have been
attributable to other causes, such as war in the Middle East or a
strengthening dollar? What if the defendant's company might have
gone bankrupt regardless of the fraud? How can we tell, by a
preponderance of the evidence or more, if a defendant could have
foreseen such a loss?
The more guidance the Sentencing Commission provides on how
to calculate loss, the less flexibility prosecutors have to manipulate
loss amounts. Some of the massive but speculative losses alleged in
Olis and other cases would shrink because prosecutors would be
able to prove only the more concrete losses by a preponderance of
the evidence.
Second, the Sentencing Commission should calibrate white-collar
sentences to their core purpose. The prospect of routine probation
for white-collar offenders in the old days rightly trouBled many
people. Fines seemed like a mere tax on business that allowed
wealthy criminals to buy their way out of real punishment. Short
but certain terms of imprisonment would go a long way toward
satisfying the demand for unequivocal condemnation. Few white-
collar defendants deserve decades in prison, as if they were three
times worse than rapists. Rather, one could add bite to short white-
73. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 n.3(A)(i) (2004) (defining actual
loss as "the reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm ... result[ing] from the offense"); id.
§ 2B1.1 n.3(A)(iv) (requiring that losses be foreseeable results of the offense).
74. See Warren, supra note 27 (reporting that Judge Lake calculated the lost value based
on the University of California's retirement fund loss of $105 million). Shortly before this
Essay went to press, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated Olis's sentence
and remanded his case for resentencing in light of Booker. In its opinion, the Fifth Circuit
criticized how Judge Lake had computed Olis's loss amount. United States u. Dlis, No. 04-
20322, 2005 WL 2842077, at *3-7 (5th Cir. Oct. 31, 2005).
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collar prison terms by coupling them with shaming penalties. A$
Professors Dan Kahan and Eric Posner have argued, white-collar
offenders have a great deal of reputational capital and are particu-
larly sensitive to shaming.75 A mere sentence of community service
or charitable works would not effectively communicate condemna-
tion of the crime. Felons ought to spend a few years in prison, not
home detention or halfway houses. But they should also have to
apologize and make restitution to victims and communities, and in
appropriate cases they should endure some stigmatizing publicity
as well. This combination of punishments might foster deterrence,
inflict retribution, express condemnation, and heal victims at a
fraction of the cost. It would condemn and deter crime ex ante
without sacrificing ex post individualized justice.
CONCLUSION
In Apprendi and Blakely, the Supreme Court purported to strike
a blow for juries and populist control of criminal justice. Juries,
however, are unlikely to loom large post-Booker, and they certainly
will not set white-collar sentences in any meaningful sense,
Congress is not about to hamper prosecutors by making juries
answer complex special verdict questions beyond a reasonable
doubt. Rather, Congress will leave power in prosecutors' hands.
Prosecutors will keep trying to set sentences, but judges may have
modestly more power to counterbalance them. The Sentencing
Commission could reduce prosecutorial manipulation by clarifying
loss computations and could authorize shaming penalties to
complement imprisonment. If, however, judges abuse their new-
found freedom, their excessive leniency could provoke a harsh
overreaction. Congress would likely step in with more mandatory
penalties, causing white-collar prosecution to look more like drug
prosecution. In short, history may be about to repeat itself. Just as
judicial inconsistency and perceived leniency led to the Sentencing
Guidelines, so post-Booker judicial variation may lead Congress to
75. See Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White-Collar Criminals: A Proposal
for Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 365, 368-72 (1999); see also
Jayne W. Barnard, Reintegrative Shaming in Corporate Sentencing, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 959,
966-99 (1999) (arguing that shaming procedures at sentencing can deter and induce
constructive changes in corporate behavior).
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pass even tougher laws. In other words, judges may soon bring
even more of a straitjacket upon themselves, to the satisfaction of
prosecutors.
